Your Location:
Home >
Browse articles >
Incentive effects and institutional design of insurance company participation in high-standard farmland maintenance: An evolutionary game analysis
Incentive effects and institutional design of insurance company participation in high-standard farmland maintenance: An evolutionary game analysis
- “In response to the problem of "heavy construction, light management and protection" in high standard farmland, researchers used evolutionary game theory to systematically characterize the dynamic strategic interaction among the "construction subject insurance company farmers". They found that the insurance policy of the construction subject is a key prerequisite for the intervention of the insurance mechanism, and a single policy tool is difficult to achieve collaborative governance. It is necessary to simultaneously meet the incentive compatibility conditions of the three parties. Farmer behavior is the key end variable that determines the performance of the system operation, providing a solution for promoting the full life cycle management and protection system linked by insurance.”
- Journal of China Agricultural University Vol. 31, Issue 11, Pages: 360-372(2026)
DOI: 10.11841/j.issn.1007-4333.2026.11.27
Accepted:27 May 2026
Scan QR Code
Full Text(HTML)
Figs( 5 ) Tabs( 5 )
References
Publication Info
Metrics
33
Views
63
Downloads
0
CSCD
Alert me when the article has been cited
Submit
Tools
- BibTeXDownload
- EndnoteDownload
- RefMan Download
- NoteExpressDownload
- NoteFirstDownload
Related Articles
Multi-actor collaborative strategies and optimization pathways for high-standard farmland construction
Impact of agricultural insurance on the green total factor productivity in agriculture
Collaborative development mechanism of multi-subject entities in rural distributed photovoltaic industry: From an evolutionary game perspective
Competition in the agricultural insurance market and efficiency of agricultural production: From the perspective of government incentives
Modeling and simulation of the tripartite game theory for e-commerce agricultural product quality and safety supervision under the traffic reward and punishment mechanism
Related Author
TENG Yun
TANG Xinyue
MA Li
GAO Cuiling
JIA Shiyu
CHAI Zhihui
XU Juan
YIN Shi
Related Institution
College of Agricultural Equipment and Energy Engineering, Northeast Agricultural University
College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Inner Mongolia Agricultural University
College of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia Agricultural University
College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hebei Agricultural University
College of Economics and Management,Hebei Agricultural University


